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1. Introduction
The decline of agriculture's contribution to national income is a central feature of economic
development. The share of GDP originating in agriculture, initially greater than 50% in many
poor countries, is typically much less than 10% in wealthy countries.  Time-series data from
individual developing countries exhibit the same trend.  In the course of this shift, agriculture
releases primary factors to sectors making more intensive use of reproducible capital, thus
contributing to faster economic growth.  In order to understand growth and development
processes, therefore, it is necessary to examine the forces that govern structural change.
Analysis of the determinants of agriculture's decline should also inform the interpretation and
evaluation of the effects of sector policies on growth in developing economies.
Given the importance of the subject, it is surprising to find that very little effort has been
devoted to quantifying the sources of agricultural decline.  To our knowledge the only empirical
studies are the two by Martin and Warr (1993, 1994), which we discuss in detail below.  This
paper makes three additional contributions.  First, we quantify the effects of major price policies
as determinants of structural change separately from those of underlying price trends.  Second,
we identify separately the influence of human capital accumulation as a factor in structural
change.  Third, we present findings indicating that over time, the sources of agricultural decline
may shift and even change sign as economies and policies evolve.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and
new elements introduced in our analysis.  Section 3 describes the basic model.  Section 4
discusses estimation issues, Section 5 presents data and measurement, and Section 6 presents
empirical results.  A final section provides concluding observations on the development process
and development policies.2
2. Theory and empirical motivation
Sources of structural change
The "classics" of development economics ascribe the relative decline of agriculture to
fundamentally secular forces, specifically asymmetric changes in preferences, technologies, and
factor endowments (Lewis 1954; Johnston and Mellor 1961; Chenery et al. 1986; Timmer
1988).
1
On the demand side, less than unitary elasticities of demand for staple foods mean that as
per capita income grows, a declining proportion of household expenditure is devoted to
agriculture.  By Engel's law, as per-capita income rises, expenditure shifts toward services and
manufactured goods relative to food.  In a closed economy, the preference shift causes the
relative price of food to decline, other things equal.  This in turn reduces returns to factors used
in agricultural production, causing a net migration of labor and capital to other sectors (Schultz
1953; Timmer 1988), thus reducing relative growth rates of agricultural output and employment.
In a small open economy with both tradable and non-tradable sectors, agriculture’s share in GDP
also declines if demand for non-tradable goods is income-elastic, since demand growth bids up
their prices relative to those of goods more freely traded in world markets (Anderson 1987).
On the supply side, explanations for agricultural decline have been dominated by
asymmetric growth in factor endowments and differences in sectoral productivity growth rates.  The
two are closely related; for the Hicks-neutral case, differences in technical change rates between
sectors affect the composition of aggregate output in a way exactly analogous to differential rates of
factor endowment growth.  Curiously, however, it is technical progress rather than factor
endowment growth that has received more attention in the development economics literature.
2   The
effects of unbalanced endowment growth rates on economic structure are nevertheless potentially3
profound.  This prediction is familiar in the form of Rybczynski's theorem, which states that in a
two-sector, two-good economy, an increase in the total supply of capital relative to labor will
influence the output mix, for given product prices and technology.  Specifically, the theorem
predicts that a small increase in the capital-labor ratio will increase the output of the relatively
capital-intensive good, and reduce the output of the relatively labor-intensive good.
3  Given that an
increase in the capital-labor ratio, fueled by savings and investment, is the mainspring of structural
change in all classical models of growth, the preference for technical progress stories over
endowment growth in supply-side explanations of agricultural decline is puzzling.
It is only very recently that the foregoing assertions about the sources of structural change
have been subjected to any formal quantitative testing.  Recent econometric analyses have
suggested that it is changes in factor endowments—the so-called Rybczinski effects—that
actually dominate, with relative price changes (i.e. demand side effects) playing a much smaller
role, and technical progress a negligible one.  This ordering reverses that of earlier writing.  As
the authors of these analyses note, their results "appear to require a reorientation of the literature
on the declining share of agriculture in open economies" (Martin and Warr 1993:398).
Whatever the true distribution of explanatory power among the three sources identified
above, the overall emphasis on secular forces suggests a uniformity in the sources of agricultural
decline that is not matched by developing country experience.  Growth and structural change
differences among countries, and over time within countries, are most frequently explained in
terms of economic policies.  These include agricultural policies, but also those directed at other
areas of economic activity but which affect relative sectoral growth rates through general
equilibrium mechanisms (Krueger et al. 1988; Timmer 1988; Stern 1989; Sah and Stiglitz 1984).
Direct agricultural pricing policies and the indirect effects of macroeconomic policies can4
in principle exert a significant long-run impact on economic structure. It is well known that many
developing country governments have attempted to suppress and/or stabilize agricultural
producer prices through procurement policies, export taxation, and/or export quotas.  In addition,
macroeconomic and industrial protection policies have indirect effects on agricultural prices: an
industrial promotion policy is an implicit tax on activity in all other sectors (Corden 1974).  It is
widely observed that the indirect effects of trade and exchange rate policies designed to protect
import-competing manufactures in developing economies embody a systematic bias against
agriculture (Krueger et al. 1988).
In spite of this, current empirical investigations of the decline of agriculture do not
incorporate measures of the effects of policies and conversely, quantitative analyses of
development policy are typically content to address its impacts at the sectoral level rather than on
overall economic structure.  There is a need to reconcile the two strands of the literature.
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A second little-recognized source of structural change is the accumulation of human
capital.   It is now standard to include some measure of human capital in the aggregate
production function (Lucas 1988; Schultz 1988; Barro 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Lau et
al. 1993; World Bank 1993); indeed, to omit human capital from an analysis of aggregate growth
is to mis-specify the model.  The same argument must apply to the analysis of structural change.
Since agriculture and non-agriculture typically use skilled labor in differing proportions, it
follows from Rybczinski that differences in the rate at which the skilled labor force grows must
also influence the rate of agriculture's relative decline.
A third point regarding structural change concerns its variation over time.  Poor countries
typically tax agriculture relative to other tradable sectors, while industrialized countries tend to
protect their farmers (Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 1970; Anderson and Hayami 1986; Lindert5
1991, David and Huang 1996).  A number of phenomena contribute to this change.  Economic
growth diminishes the importance of agricultural taxation as a source of government revenue; the
desire to maintain agricultural exports motivates a reduction of export taxes; and finally, the
political influence of agricultural producers diminishes less quickly than the decline of the
sector's contribution to GDP.  As a result, government policies are likely to increase the rate of
agricultural decline in early stages of development, and reduce it subsequently.
Empirical motivation
In the econometric analysis that follows, we make use of data from Thailand, a middle-income
developing economy.  However, our arguments are based on three broad observations that are
immediately recognizable in the development experiences of many developing countries.  First,
many developing-country governments tax agriculture not only directly, through pricing policies,
but also indirectly, through macroeconomic and industrial policies aimed primarily at promoting
industrialization (Krueger et al. 1988).  Both direct pricing policies and indirect discrimination
often result in suppression (and sometimes stabilization) of agricultural prices in the domestic
market.  For Thailand, Figure 1 shows how domestic agricultural prices relative to
nonagricultural prices diverge from border prices—the prices that would have prevailed in the
absence of the direct and indirect effects of government intervention.  Domestic agricultural
prices are both lower and less volatile than border prices.  It follows that a part of what is usually
taken to be a secular price trend is in fact due to the unaccounted effects of government policies.
<Figure 1 about here>
The second observation is that relative agricultural prices may decline in secular fashion,
but policies affecting them may change over time as political economy dictates.  For Thailand,6
Figure 2 shows levels of the nominal protection rate for agriculture (a negative value indicates an
effective tax on agriculture).
5  An inverse parabola fits these data very well,
6 and this highlights
an additional empirical observation, that changes in the net taxation of agriculture are not
necessarily linear.
<Figure 2 about here>
The third observation is that human capital accumulation is fundamental to the economics
of agricultural decline.  Quantitative estimates of the contribution of factor endowment growth to
agricultural decline should include measures of growth in these endowments.
On the basis of these three observations, our empirical analysis takes the pioneering work
of Martin and Warr (1993, 1994) as a starting point and extends it to incorporate agricultural
pricing policies and human capital accumulation as additional factors explaining the relative
decline of agriculture.  Using a translog revenue function, we derive an expression for the share
of agriculture in national income as a function of the border prices of commodities, agricultural
pricing policies, and factor endowments including human capital.  We then estimate the
structural relationship between agriculture's GDP share and its determinants using a vector error-
correction-mechanism (VECM) model.   This approach is particularly versatile when dealing
with endogeneity and nonstationary data in time series analysis.  We estimate the model on Thai
data by Johansen’s (1988) method.
Our empirical results may be summarized as follows.  First, agricultural price
policies—effective agricultural taxes—are found to be the most important measures influencing
the relative decline of agriculture in Thailand.  Their relative contributions to the decline are
greater than that of all other supply factors combined.  Second, by increasing effective
agricultural taxes, past Thai governments accelerated the rate of agricultural decline in the early7
stages of postwar economic development.  Subseqent policy reforms in the late 1980s—a decade
in which manufacturing income grew far faster than agricultural income—slowed the
agricultural decline.  Third, in contrast to Martin and Warr’s finding that capital accumulation
made the greatest contribution to the decline of Thai agriculture, we find renewed support for
relative price trends as major contributing factors—inclusive, that is, of the effects of policies
affecting the domestic sectoral terms of trade.  Accumulation of physical and human capital are
the second and third factors, after prices.  Finally, sectoral asymmetries in technological progress
play no significant role in the structural transformation.
3. The Model
In this section we present a model for estimating the determinants of agricultural decline for a
time series of data from Thailand.  The fundamental analytical construct is the revenue function
(Dixit and Norman 1980; Woodland 1982).  As we demonstrate, a translog flexible functional
form of the revenue function yields tractable empirical relationships among variables of interest.
Consider a small open economy characterized by constant returns to scale and
competitive market equilibrium. Assume that there are two aggregate outputs, agriculture (A) and
non-agriculture (N), and four types of inputs: physical capital (K), labor (L), human capital (H),
and land (R).  The aggregate production possibility frontier can be defined by the implicit
production possibility frontier
G(A,N,K,L,H,R) = 0  (1)
For given factor endowments and technology, the allocation of resources between A and N—that
is, the economically optimal position on the frontier—depends on relative commodity prices, and
is found as the solution to maximization problem:
r(P,Z)= max PY:Y ŒY(Z) [ ], P,Y Œ¬
2,Z Œ¬
4 ,   (2)8
where r is maximized aggregate revenue or GDP; Y is the final goods vector, P is the vector of
final goods prices, and Y(Z) is the convex producible set given endowments Z={L, K, H, R}.
The vector of output supplies x(P, Z) is given by the gradient of the revenue function with
respect to prices.
xi(P,Z) = ∂r(P,Z)/ ∂P i  for i = A, N.  (3)
We assume that the revenue function is twice continuously differentiable with respect to prices,
so that the outputs in each sector are uniquely determined.  As in standard international trade
models, we also assume non-jointness in input quantities; that is, there exists a production
function for each good.  We also assume that the agricultural production is relatively less
intensive in the use of both physical and human capital than is non-agriculture. For given
technology and prices, Rybczinski's theorem then suggests that physical or human capital
accumulation will reduce increase nonagricultural output and employment, and reduce
agricultural output and employment.
Now consider the effects of technical change on the revenue function. Supposing (for
expositional purposes) that technologies in both sectors are exogenously determined and are
neutral with respect to factors, they can be represented by shift parameters in a vector T.  We can
then rewrite the revenue function as r(P, Z, T ). The corresponding supply functions are :
xi = T i fi(P,Z) for i = A,N.  (4)
In (4), an increase in Ti indicates Hicks-neutral technological change in sector i, and is
equivalent to a price increase for the sector concerned, since an increase in Ti means higher
production value for given factor use (Dixit and Norman 1980:137). Therefore, we can rewrite
the revenue function as r(TP, Z), where TP is a vector with elements (TAPA, T NPN).
For estimation purposes, we approximate the revenue function by a translog functional9
form.  Following Woodland (1982) and Kohli (1991), we can derive the translog revenue
function from (1) as:
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where  ln denotes the natural logarithm;
 r  = total revenue;
Pi = prices of agriculture and non-agriculture  (i, j = A, N);
Fk  = quasi-fixed factor inputs (k = K, H, L, R); and
ai  , bi , dij  are parameters to be estimated.
The revenue function is linearly homogeneous in prices, which implies the following restrictions
on parameter values:  ai =1
i Â ;  aij = 0,
i Â "j; and  dik = 0,"k
i Â .
Differentiating (5) with respect to ln(TPi) and imposing homogeneity restrictions yields
sectoral share functions.  The GDP share of sector i is a function of prices, factor supplies and
technology parameters:
Si = ai + a ijln(TjPj)+
j Â dik ln(Fk)
k Â , "j  = A,N and "k = K,L,H,R,  (6)
where Si ≡ (PiYi)/SjPjYj is the GDP share of sector i.  By the properties of the revenue function,
the output supply function and GDP shares are both homogenous of degree zero in prices. Thus
we can normalize PA by PN.  With constant returns to scale, we can express all quantities in
intensive form, which we do by dividing all factor inputs by labor. Thus we have in one equation
a complete description of the factors determining the GDP share of agriculture:
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Equation (7) can be viewed as representing the long-run equilibrium structure of the economy.
The agricultural share depends on relative domestic prices, relative factor supplies, and
differential rate of technical change.  The model derivation provides a convenient vehicle for
testing hypotheses concerning sources of decline in the agricultural share of GDP.
7
In a small open economy with competitive markets and no interventions, the domestic
producer price of a tradable agricultural product would be the same as the border price of an
identical good in the world market, evaluated at the official nominal exchange rate and adjusted
for transport, storage, and other costs.  Observed relative domestic prices would thus encompass
the true relative border price and the effects of taxes imposed by the government. Defining p as
the observed domestic relative price, and letting p
* stand for the real border price, we would have
p = p
*(1+ g),  (8)
where g is a measure of the total nominal protection rate, capturing both the direct effect of price
interventions and the indirect effects of economy-wide on the domestic price (for a more detailed
discussion, see Krueger et al. 1988).  Empirically, we do not expect (8) to hold exactly, most
obviously because some part of the intervention does not operate through market prices.
Similarly, the impact of technical change on agriculture's GDP share need not be exactly
equivalent to that of a change in domestic relative prices, since Hicks-neutrality is not assured.
With these cautions in mind, we decompose the price term in (7) into its border price and policy
components to obtain an estimable equation:
SA = a A + a Apln p
* ( )+ a Ag ln 1+ g ( )+ a AT ln TA
TN
Ê 
Ë  Á 
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In (9), we allow for border prices, price policies, and technological change to have separate11
effects on the share of agriculture. In this equation y is a stochastic error term indicating
unobserved shocks and measurement errors.
Equation (9) incorporates both classical and non-classical factors in explaining
agriculture's relative decline. In particular, it allows for the separation of an overall price effect
into its components due to policies and border prices, and for Rybczinski effects from several
types of factor endowment growth. The structural relationship in (9) provides a new framework
for investigating long-run equilibrium relations and is feasible to be tested. We explore the
details in the next section.
4. Estimation Issues and Hypothesis Testing
The long-run specification in (9) assumes free movement of factors among sectors and abstracts
from adjustment processes.  If the reallocation of factors among sectors in response to changes in
technology, prices, and aggregate factor supplies is costly and/or occurs with a lag—as in most
agricultural production— the aggregate share observed will reflect deviations from equilibrium..
It is thus important that the model capture dynamic responses and adjustment processes.   We
expect, moreover, to find that some of the explanatory variables in (9) are not strictly exogenous.
This problem is more likely to occur if there is lagged transmission of the last-period errors into
a current-period decision.
The conditional VECM form provides a convenient means to handle both the dynamic
processes and the endogeneity problem in (9), and the relationship can be estimated by
Johansen’s (1988) method.  We can define the conditional VECM as follows:
DY t = G0DZt + G1DXt-1 +ab'Xt-1 + FDt + Yt   (10)
where Yt is a vector containing only endogenous variables; Zt is a vector of weakly exogenous
variables (included in the cointegration space); Xt-1 is a vector of all variables; Dt is a vector of12
non-stochastic variables, such as a dummy variable for periods before and after a policy shift;
and Yt is a stationary multivariate disturbance.  For parameters to be estimated, G0 and G1 show
the short run adjustments to changes in Zt and Xt-1 respectively; a represents the speed of
adjustment, and b is a matrix of long-run coefficients such that b¢Xt-1 represents up to (n-1)
cointegration relationships which ensure that variables in Xt converge to their long-run steady
states.  The linear combination of levels Xt-1 is just its combination which is stationary in levels,
so Yt is I(0) and can be said to be white noise.  The estimates of ab¢ show long run adjustment.
A test of the hypothesis that aij is zero for j=1,…,r provides a test for weak exogeneity of
the explanatory variables.  The LR test statistic for this is TSlog[(1–l*)/(1–l)], where l
* are new
eigenvalues for the restricted model.  This statistic has a c
2 distribution with r(n–m) degrees of
freedom, where r is the number of cointegration relationships, n the number of possible
endogenous variables, and m the number of endogenous variables (Johansen and Juselius 1992).
In estimation, one important issue that must be addressed is that of a possible structural
break in our time-series data or in the model relationship.  The first possibility, that of a
structural break in the data, can be easily checked when testing unit roots.  The second can be
addressed using the standard dummy variable technique and the conditional VECM form in
model estimation.
The final estimation issue is to test the number of cointegration relationships.  The null
hypothesis is that there are at most r cointegration vectors and (n–r) unit roots as: Ho: li = 0 for i
= r+1,…,n; where only the first r eigenvalues are nonzero and li is the eigenvalue. Two common
likelihood ratio tests (the Trace and l-max statistics) can be used to test this hypothesis
(Johansen and Juselius 1990).
According to the theory presented in Section 2, we expect the following ceteris paribus13
results.  An increase in the real border price of agriculture would imply a greater share of
agriculture in GDP, as would an increase in net agricultural protection (g) and an increase in the
index of technical change in agriculture relative to that in non-agriculture. An increase in the
physical capital-labor ratio should reduce the share of agriculture, as predicted by the
Rybczynski theorem under the assumption that agricultural production is relatively less intensive
than non-agriculture in the use of physical capital.  By the same reasoning, an increase in the
ratio of human capital to labor should also result in a lower share of agriculture.
5. Data Measurement and Trends
Measurement.
The analysis employs national-level data set based on official statistics covering 1951 to 1995.
8
The domestic relative price is calculated using implicit price deflators of agriculture relative to
non-agriculture. Implicit price deflators are calculated by dividing output at current prices by
output at a constant price.  Real border prices represent relative commodity prices at the border
when both direct and indirect pricing policies on agriculture prices are removed. These policies
are measured as the total nominal protection rate (NPR).  We calculated the aggregate NPR from
the total NPR of the three major crops (rice, rubber, and maize), weighted by the share of each in
total agricultural exports.
9  The aggregate NPR prior to 1960 is approximated by the percentage
of agricultural export taxes to export values by crop.  In the absence of direct data, the aggregate
NPR between 1987 and 1990 is approximated by the average of the three earlier years. For the
same reason, the NPR after 1990 is assumed to be constant at 15 per cent—a proximate number
for the impact of indirect macroeconomic policies only.  In this period, most direct agricultural
trade policies had already been largely removed.
The total labor force is defined by the population aged over 13 years.  Prior to 1960 we14
have data only for 1947 and 1954.  We fill the gaps in the early part of the series by
interpolation.  The aggregate capital stock series is obtained from official sources for the period
after 1970.  For earlier years, we estimate the series recursively using the standard perpetual
inventory method. The estimated depreciation rate is 5%, as suggested by Limskul (1988).
The measurement of human capital deserves careful attention since other parameter
estimates might be sensitive to human capital measurement. In this paper we construct indices of
human capital stock based on the returns to schooling.  The basic idea is to combine a wage
differential index (as a proxy for returns to schooling) with data on years of schooling of the
labor force.  This method is preferred to the more frequently used school enrollment data for two
reasons. First, the gross enrollment ratio data—the number of enrolled children in the relevant
age range divided by the total number of children in that age range when school is
open—overestimate schooling investments and are likely to differ from net enrollment (Behrman
1993).  Second, wage differentials should reflect differences in the marginal productivity of
schooling.  Thus the stock of human capital at year t, Ht, can be defined as a weighted sum over
labor force subgroups defined by education:




where Wi denotes the wage differential index; Si the average years of schooling of members in
the ith group; and Ni the number of workers in the ith group.
The land endowment is measured as cultivated land area.  This measure takes account of
increases in effective land area due to irrigation, which permits double-cropping.  In the absence
Technological change in non-agriculture is estimated by a total factor productivity growth (TFP)
index, calculated using the growth accounting technique.
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Trends in Data.
Over the sample period, the domestic agriculture-non-agriculture price ratio has a slight but
stable downward trend, falling by an average 0.45% per year (Figure 1). It appears to drift with
persistent deviations from any underlying price level trend.  In contrast, the real border price
shows more variation and was much higher than the domestic ratio.
The calculated total NPR (Figure 2) shows a pronounced nonlinear trend.  Between 1950
and 1975, a period of relatively high and increasing protectionism, the total NPR increased from
around 20% to around 40% of the real border price.  It then began to rise sharply from the early
1980s, following a significant relaxation of rice export restrictions in 1980-81.  After 1983, the
Thai government embarked on a liberalization program that resulted in significant reductions in
non-agricultural trade barriers.
The agricultural share of GDP, measured at 1972 prices, is shown in Figure 3. It declined
from over 50 % in 1951 to around 10 % in 1995, an average annual decline of 3.5 %.
<Figure 3 about here>
On the input side, all the series depicted in Figures 4 to 7 trended up or down for
sustained periods.  The capital-labor ratio (Figure 6) appears to be much less volatile than either
agriculture's GDP share or relative prices. It increased during a period of massive public
investment in infrastructure and communications in the early 1960s, then after a long period of
slow growth in the 1970s, showed a new surge during the foreign investment-led boom of the
1980s.
<Figures 4-7 about here>
In Figure 7 we show the average human capital stock (H1), and also, for comparison, the
secondary school enrollment rate (H2). At best, the enrollment ratio represents investment levels16
in human capital, and is likely to overestimate schooling investment.
The land-labor ratio (Figure 8) declined during the period covered by our data.  However,
it increased in 1960-1975, largely through expansion of cultivated area, which grew at an annual
rate of 3.9 % during the 1970s then slowed to average of 1 % in the 1980s.  The lower growth
rate indicates the closing of the land frontier in the late 1970s.  Finally, both sectoral indexes of
technical change (Figure 9) show increasing trends, with that in non-agriculture outstripping that
in agriculture after the late 1960s.
<Figures 8-9 about here>
6. Empirical Analysis
In this section we present two major results.  First, we explore the long-run structural
relationship between the agricultural share and its determinants, presenting estimates of the
cointegrating vector from the conditional VECM model.  Second, we present a decomposition of
contributions to the relative decline of agriculture.
Long-run relationship between the share and its determinants
Before discussing the results from the conditional VECM model, we first report routine
statistical tests on unit roots, cointegration and weak exogeneity, respectively.
Unit Root Test. We test for an I(1) process in data, using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test with constant term and  time-trend. Since the ADF test is sensitive to the order of
augmentation, we use the Campbell and Perron (1991) criterion for choosing the optimal lag
length in the ADF test to increase the test power. Too few lags in the ADF test may result in
over-rejection of the null when it is true, while too many lags may reduce the power of the test.
The non-standard critical values of the ADF test are from MacKinnon (1991). The test statistics17
(Table 1) show no strong evidence against the null hypothesis of the unit roots of the variable of
interest at the 5% significance level.
<Table 1 about here>
The results of unit root tests when allowing for a possible structural break are reported in
Table 2. Overall, we again find no evidence against unit roots.  Using the recursive minimum
ADF t-statistics (column b in the table), we cannot reject the null even after allowing for the
structural break in the series. Using our a priori information, we suspect a structural break
associated with the major change in rice export policy in 1981 and the subsequent reduction in
industry sector protection.  We recalculate the ADF test, including dummy variables to capture
changes in means (column c) and in trend (column d). The new results show similar results. We
cannot reject the null with the possibility of the break in mean or in trend in all variables.
<Table 2 about here>
Cointegration Test  The results of the unit root tests indicate that it is possible to define a
stable relationship between the agricultural share and its determinants in terms of cointegration
relationships. We employ Johansen’s method to find the number of such relationships.  In the
Johansen model, we also include two exogenous dummy variables: D81 and D81*ln(1+g). The
D81 variable captures a change in the intercept after 1981, and the interaction term D81*ln(1+g)
captures a change in slope.
The Johansen test results, obtained using the CATS program (Hansen and Juselius 1995),
are reported in Table 3. The first null hypothesis is that there is no cointegrating vector (Ho: r=
0) with the alternative is that there is one cointegrating vector (Ha: p-r).  The second null is that
there is at most one cointegrating vector against two, and so on. We report the trace statistic, its
critical value at the 10% significance level, and estimated eigenvalues.  The trace statistics18
indicate that there are three cointegrating relationships among variables at the 10% significance
level.  Since there is no clear economic explanation for these extra relationships, we impose the
restriction that there is one cointegration relationship in our model. In doing so we follow current
literature suggesting emphasis on the economic relationship rather than statistical relationship
(Harris 1995).  The implication of this choice is some efficiency loss in estimation.
<Table 3 about here>
Table 4 shows the normalized estimates of a and b obtained from the Johansen test. The
b vector sets the element associated with the share equal to 1, representing the cointegration
relationship.  The a vector represents the speed of adjustment for each endogenous variable from
the last period disequilibrium.
<Table 4 about here>
Weak Exogeneity Test. The low t-statistics on a suggest that human capital, technology,
and the real border price might be weakly exogenous.
11  We conduct a weak exogeneity test for
these variables. The test statistic of the null of a2 = a4 = a6 = 0 is the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test.
The LR statistics shown at the end of the table do not exceed the Chi-square with 3 degrees of
freedom, which is 6.25 at the 10 % level.  Thus we do not reject the null hypothesis that these
variables are weakly exogenous.
Knowing that some variables are weakly exogenous, we reapply Johansen’s method in
estimating Eq. (10)—the conditional VECM form.  Endogenous variables in this construct are
the share, the effective agricultural tax, the capital-labor ratio, and the land-labor ratio.  Weakly
exogenous variables are the real border prices, the technological bias, and the average human
capital.  Table 5 shows results of parameter estimates of the multivariate system in Eq. (10).
<Table 5 about here>19
The diagnostic tests of the model are shown at the end of Table 5.
12  For goodness of fit
of the model, the Ljung-Box test shows no serial correlation problem of the first 10 lags; and the
Shenton-Bowman test,c
2(8), does not indicate non-normality of multivariate residuals.  For each
equation, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(ARCH) of order 1 in the residuals shows no sign of a problem, and the Shenton-Bowman test
does not show any non-normality problem in the residuals.
Estimates from the conditional VECM model.  From Table 4, estimates of the
cointegration vector b, or the long-run structural relationship between the share and its
determinants, can be represented as follows:






















The coefficients on all of the variables have the predicted signs.  A one per cent increase in the
real border prices will increase the agricultural share of total GDP by 0.1%.  Agricultural pricing
policies—effective agricultural taxes—have a negative effect on the share.  Increasing the
effective agricultural tax rate by 1 per cent will decrease the share of agriculture by 0.42%.  This
impact is much larger than the impact of the real border prices.
 A one per cent increase in the capital stock per unit of labor will reduce agriculture's
share by approximately 0.96%.  This is consistent with the Rybczynski theorem and our
expectations about the relative capital-intensity of sectors.  Given prices, technology, and the
endowments of labor and other factors, accumulation of physical capital will increase factor
productivity in non-agriculture, a process which will result in the withdrawal of complementary
factors (unskilled labor) out of agriculture.  In this ceteris paribus example, agricultural output
would fall in absolute terms as a result; in practice, with all factor endowments growing but the20
capital stock at a faster rate, the growth rate of agriculture lags behind that of the economy as a
whole.
An increase in human capital has the same type of impact. A one per cent increase in
average human capital will decrease the share of agriculture by 0.05%.  Conversely, a one per
cent increase in the land-labor ratio has a positive impact on agriculture's share. This result is
once again consistent with the Rybczynski theorem, since agriculture is land-intensive relative to
other sectors. Finally, a one per cent increase in the index of differential technical change
(agriculture relative to non-agriculture) increases the share of agriculture by 0.03%.
Decomposition of the factor contribution.
Using the estimates from the cointegration regression, we can decompose the factors
contributing to long run changes in the agricultural share in Thailand.  The results are shown in
Table 6, for the entire period and for the subperiods before and after the beginning of the reform
phase.  For each period we report the average rate of change in each explanatory variable and its
contribution to the overall decline in the share of agriculture, calculated as 100 times the average
annual change of each variable multiplied by the relevant coefficient from Eq. (11).
<Table 6 about here>
Consider first the results for the whole period.  Movement in the real border price
accounts for only 7.2 % of the decline in agriculture’s share.  Sharp increases in the capital-labor
ratio and average human capital also contribute to the decline, by 67.8 and 22.2 %, respectively.
On average, agricultural pricing policies show a benign impact on Thai farmers over almost five
decades, a finding that is both counterintuitive and at odds with the historical evidence.
By allowing for a structural break, however, we reach conclusions that contrast strongly21
with those for the model with no break.  The last four columns of Table 6 show the relative
contribution of each factor before and after 1980, respectively.  Each variable's contribution is
calculated using the coefficients and average annual changes corresponding to that sub-period.
These results indicate that agricultural pricing policies were the most important factors
contributing to the decline during 1951-1980. The relative impact of effective taxes is greater
than that of all the other supply factors combined. Compared with other factors, real border price
changes helped offset the pressure from policy in this period.
During 1981-1995, the increase in the capital-labor ratio made the most important
contribution to agricultural decline, followed by real border price trends and growth in the land-
labor ratio.  This result is consistent with the historical record: during this period, capital
accumulation was at its highest rate in decades; agricultural prices in world markets were lower
than they had been during the previous three decades; and land availability was diminished by
the closing of the land frontier.  Most importantly, policies were the only sources of an increase
in agriculture's GDP share during this period.
Finally, in both periods, differences in technological change between sectors made an
insignificant contribution to the decline of agriculture.
It is worth comparing these results with those of Martin and Warr.
13  Their studies
concluded that demand-side factors, operating through relative commodity prices, are less
important than supply-side influences, which are largely determined by capital accumulation.
For Thailand, they found that changes in the capital-labor ratio contributed 72% of the total
decline in the agriculture share in 1960-85, and relative price effects contributed the remainder.
Our analysis, taking government policies and policy trends as well as human capital
accumulation into consideration, suggests a reinterpretation both of the conventional wisdom of22
the development economics literature and of the earlier empirical results.  First, relative rates of
factor accumulation are clearly important, a finding we share with Martin and Warr.  However,
once the model is refined to include a more disaggregated definition of "capital", we find
proportionally different contributions from physical and human capital accumulation.  Moreover,
our results show the relative contribution of each form of capital to alter over time.
Second, while a model fitted to the entire series confirms the finding that demand side
(price) influences are less important than factor endowment growth, separate identification of
policy trends and the division of the data into sub-periods once again reveals a generally larger
price effect story and a major role for policy.  Offsetting border price and price policy trends may
have resulted in an underestimate of price effects in earloier studies.  Ultimately, however, the
ranking of influences over agriculture's decline in our study concurs with that of Martin and
Warr, and not with the "conventional" view: Engel effects and sectoral differences in technical
progress are in the main, secondary to the process of structural change.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we define the long run structural relationship between the agricultural share and its
determinants in the form of a cointegration relationship, derived from an underlying economic
model. The vector error-correction-mechanism (VECM) form applied to this structural
relationship captures both the endogeneity of variables and their dynamic adjustments.  The
Johansen reduced rank regression was used to estimate this model.
Our study shows that agricultural pricing policies, which are equivalent to effective
agricultural taxes, have played the dominant role in agricultural decline at the early stages of
development and in offsetting the decline in later stages.  Physical and human capital
accumulation have also been important, yet still secondary to pricing policies.  Engel effects and23
differential rates of technical change between sectors have had relatively small impacts.  Our
results indicate that ignoring the influence of policy and the effects of structural change can lead
to erroneous conclusions.
Our findings have important policy implications.  Despite the secular decline of
agriculture during the course of economic development, government policy is not neutral.
Development policy, by taxing agriculture, accelerates its decline. During the early development
period, effective agricultural taxes are important “push” factors for agricultural decline.  The
elimination of these taxes (as in the later period in Thailand) can be a powerful instrument in
slowing agricultural decline.  More importantly, effective taxes on agriculture appear to offset
price trends, an interesting issue for further research.
These findings enrich the economic development literature by clarifying the relative
importance of sources of the major change in economic structure that occurs during
development. While our results rely on data from Thailand, the ubiquity of direct and indirect
agricultural pricing policies as expressions of economic development strategy suggests that the
same analytical framework applied to other developing countries might be expected to produce
similar findings.  The nature and the quality of development policies that contribute to sectoral
resource reallocation, migration, and urbanization in developing countries may have a significant
impact on long-run welfare growth.  One implication is that the previous emphasis on "getting
agricultural prices right", which has dominated much policy-oriented research in the past, may be
warranted.
Our findings indicate several directions for future research. One aspect of effective
agricultural taxes not explored here is their role in stabilizing domestic prices.  Policy
recommendations to eliminate effective agricultural taxes, if implemented, will not only lead to24
higher domestic producer prices, but may also increase variances. Measuring the costs and
benefits of price stabilization is thus one topic for future research.  Another is a more detailed
exploration of the political economy of changes in agricultural policies, from discrimination to
protection.  Modeling agricultural protection as an endogenous outcome of economic
development processes could be productive.  Lastly, regarding econometric methods, modeling
nonlinear relationships in the cointegration vector should provide another means to improve the
quality of estimates.  However, the theoretical and statistical foundations of this technique are
still in their infancy.25
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics for Unit Roots, 1951-95 (With a constant term
and a time trend variable).




   Variable ADF Test Statistics Lag-length Critical Value at 5%
Share of agriculture -3.3752 3 -3.5217
Relative border price -2.4548 1 -3.5162
Tax rate -3.3438 0 -3.5136
Capital-labor ratio -1.4823 1 -3.5162
Land-labor ratio -0.8279 2 -3.5189
Average Human capital -1.6061 0 -3.5136
Differential technical changes -1.8283 1 -3.5162
Note:  Lag lengths are set by Campbell and Perron (1991) criterion.30
Table 2. Recursive and Standard Augmented-Dickey Fuller tests of unit roots, 1951-1995.




where: (1) in the shift in trend model: D = t  for  t > k, and D = 0 , otherwise.
(2) in the shift in mean model: D = 1  for t > k, and D = 0, otherwise.
Assume that the break period, k, is 1981.
Recursive Statistics ADF-test statistics
Mean- Statistics Min- statistics (assuming 1981 as date of break)
   (a) (b) Mean-shift (c) Trend-shift (d)
ln(p*) -1.224 -3.038 -1.899 -2.006
ln(1+g) -0.994 -3.126 -2.882 -3.065
ln(K/L) -0.923 -2.070 -1.851 -2.276
ln(Aa/Ana) -1.104 -2.190 -1.055 -1.673
ln(R/L) -0.866 -2.294 -1.632 -0.160
ln(H/L) -0.792 -1.914 -1.672 -1.615
Note:  The critical value at 10% is –4.00 (Banerjee et al. 1992, Table1).  The critical value at 10 %
is –3.13.31





value at  5% Note
0 7 0.640118 147.2360 124.2 *
1 6 0.536959 103.2908 94.15 *
2 5 0.477138 70.18338 68.52 *
3 4 0.389483 42.30052 47.21
4 3 0.251439 21.08222 29.68
5 2 0.173869 8.629287 15.41
6 1 0.009633 0.416216 3.76
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% significance level
Note: Calculation is based on the model with linear deterministic trend in data.32
Table 4. Results of the Johansen Estimates of the VECM (based on one cointegrating regression,
r=1)
SA ln(p*) ln(K/L) ln(H/L) ln(R/L) ln(TA/TNA) ln(1+g)
b =      [ 1.000 -0.10 0.96 0.05 -0.26 0.03 0.42
a’=      [ -0.173 -1.161 0.07 0.036 0.209 0.115 -1.671
t-value (-2.115) (-1.187) (3.119) (0.199) (2.397) (0.427) (-4.744)
Test Restriction on a2=a4=a6: The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test, c
2(2) = 4.0533
Table 5. Results of Johansen Estimates of Equation (10) and Diagnostic Tests.
D(Share) D(Capital-labor Ratio) D(Land-labor Ratio) D(Tax)
D(H/L) -0.061 0.051 -0.026 0.139
(-0.924) (3.196) -0.025 (0.531)
D(Aa/Ana) -0.057 -0.012 0.19 0.074
(-1.287) (-1.146) (2.5) (0.424)
D(p*) 0.032 0.009 0.052 0.403
(1.463) (1.647) (1.402) (4.713)
D81 -0.014 0.026 -0.2 0.034
(-0.771) (6.021) (-2.853) (1.099)
D81*tax 0.009 -0.038 0.287 -0.071
(0.273) (-4.766) (2.182) (-1.241)
Speed of Adjustment -0.176 0.094 0.326 -1.218
  (-2.04) (4.519) (2.205) (-3.584)
Diagnostic Tests
LM Test for ARCH(1) 0.804 1.147 2.125 0.586
S-B Test for normality 2.070 1.641 1.441 0.819
 
Goodness of Fit
Test for Autocorrelation: Ljung-Box (10), c
2 (156)  = 178.124, p-value = 0.07.
Normality test: Shenton-Bowman c
2 (8)  = 34.143,   p-value = 0.00.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: D stands for first difference.
Value in parenthesis is t-statistics.
All variables are in logarithmic terms, except the share.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------34
Table 6. Decomposition of the Decline in Agriculture's Share in GDP, Thailand 1951-1995.
       Whole Period         1951-1980         1981-1995
Avg. Rate Percent Avg. Rate Percent Avg. Rate Percent
  of Change Contribution of Change Contribution of Change Contribution
Price Effects:
Real Border Prices -0.0048 7.18 0.0117 -12.82 -0.0358 137.41
 
Tax Equivalence -0.0032 -19.65 0.0138 62.59 -0.0340 -542.75
 
Non-Price Effects:    
Capital-Labor Ratio 0.0048 67.85 0.0035 35.80 0.0074 268.78
 
Land-Labor Ratio -0.0050 19.33 -0.0004 1.05 -0.0138 136.58
Average Human Capital 0.0322 22.25 0.2003 10.33 0.0544 97.41
Differential Rates of Technical
  Changes b/w Sectors -0.0067 3.05 -0.0091 3.06 -0.0022 2.57
Total   100   100 10035
Notes
                                                   
1 The early literature also identifies institutional rigidities creating inefficiency in agricultural factor use as a source
of agricultural decline (Lewis 1954; Johnston and Mellor 1961).  Lacking empirical support, these theories have
languished.
2  More curiously still, the "classical" literature reveals no agreement on whether agricultural factor productivity is
can be expected to have grown more or less rapidly than factor productivity in non-agricultural sectors.  Early
structural change theories maintained that technical progress, occurring more slowly in agriculture than in other
sectors, would enhance demand-side effects by causing resources to flow out from agriculture to sectors where their
marginal productivity was higher (e.g., Johnston and Mellor 1961; Schultz 1953).  Some later theorizing suggested
instead that faster relative technical progress rates in agriculture would cause the sector to contract, as the resulting
outward shift of the agricultural supply function against inelastic demand would turn the domestic terms of trade
against the sector (Timmer 1988). The differences between these two stories are not limited to assumptions about
relative rates of technical progress.  The first implicitly assumes that the domestic terms of trade will not be
influenced by sectoral productivity growth differences. The second implicitly assumes that they will.
3 In the case of many goods and many factors, the theorem holds in an average sense (Ethier 1988).
4 This link has not escaped the attention of developing country policy makers.  Beginning in the 1920s with
Preobrazhensky's "price scissors" industrialization policies in the USSR, governments have exploited their influence
over the domestic sectoral terms of trade in efforts to extract agricultural "surplus" (Lipton 1977).
5 For the calculation of the nominal protection rate see Krueger et al. (1988).
6  Excluding the apparently anomalous first observation, a curve fitted by MS Excel gives y = 0.0004x
2  – 0.0185x –
0.169, with R
2=0.774.  Retaining the first observation reduces the R
2 to 0.51.
7 It is important to note that K, H, R and L represent aggregate endowments not sectoral factor allocations.
8 Details of data sources can be obtained in Punyasavatsut (1998).
9 Lack of data preclude a more general approach.  The three crops identified account for an average of about 50% of
agricultural production by value during the period (Siamwalla and Setboonsarng 1990).36
                                                                                                                                                                        
10 Our definition of the technical progress ratio thus differs from previous studies such as Martin and Warr (1994),
who used a time trend to capture the differential rate of technical change between agriculture and the rest of the
economy.  A time trend shows a very strong correlation with other upward-trending data such as the capital-labor
ratio and human capital to labor ratio.
11 Weak exogeneity of human capital, technology and the real border prices means that these variables contain no
information about the long-run b (a matrix of long-run coefficients) since the cointegration relationships do not enter
into these equations. Therefore the estimation model can condition on the weakly exogenous variables for greater
efficiency in estimation (Harris 1995).
12 All estimates and diagnostic test results are obtained using RATS software.
13  Models used in the Martin and Warr studies differ slightly from that presented here.  For their Thailand study,
only physical capital and labor inputs included in the production function.  Two relative price terms—agriculture
relative to non-traded goods, and manufactures relative to non-traded goods—were used.  The econometric
relationship was modeled as a system of equations with generalized autoregressive distributed lags. The endogeneity
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